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ROBERT LEES lVlcCORDIC, Respondent, v. ~AMUEL M.
CRA WFORD et al., Defendants; ABBO'r-KINNEY
COMPANY (a Corporation), Appellant.
[1] New Trial-Procedure-Statutory Period for Determination
-When Period Commences.-When the prevailing party serves
written notice of entry of judgment on the opposing party,
the time within which a motion for new trial may be made
and granted under Code Civ. Proc., § 660, begins to run.
[2] Id.-Procedure-Statutory Period for Determination-When
Period Commences-Effect of Error as to Date of Judgment
in Notice of Entry.-Inasmuch as Code Civ. Proc., § 660, does
not require that the date of entry of judgment be mentioned
in the notice, a notice of entry of judgment which erroneously
states the date of entry is not invalid and' is sufficient to set
in motion the 60-day period within which the court has, jurisdiction to grant a motion for new trial.
[3] Id.-Procedure-Notice of Entry of Judgment.-No particular
form of notice of entry of judgment is required by Code Civ.
[1] See 20 Cal.Jur. 192.
[2] See 20 Cal.Jur. 176.
McK. Dig. References: [1,2,4] New Trial, § 216(2); [3] New
Trial, § 142; [5] Theaters and Public Resorts, § 11; [6] Theaters
and Public Resorts, § 13; [7] Theaters and Public Resorts, § 12.
23 O.lld-l
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Proc., § 660. All that is essential is that the notice identify
the judgment and advise the opposing party that it has been
entered.
[4] ld.-Procedure-Statutory Period for Determination-When
Period Commencea-:-p'ower of Appellate Court to Overrido
Limitation.-Since the Legislature has fixed a 60-day period
within which a court can pass on a motion for new trial, an
appellate court is not authorized to fix any other number of
days or to override the limitation because an otherwise. correct
notice of entry of judgment fell short of a perfectIon not
prescribed by the statute. (Disapproving of language to contrary in Lauritzen v. R L. Judell tf; Go., 109 Ca1.App. 168,
292 P. 536.)
Theaters and Public Resorts-Duties and Liabilities of Owner .
-Personal lnjuriea-:-Care Requi.red.-A proprietor or operator of a place of amusement must see that the premises are in
a reasonably safe condition, and is guilty of a breach of duty
if he fails to exercise reasonably careful supervision, of the
appliances or methods of oI,erating concessions. under h~s
management. He is liable to an invited member of the pubhc
for injury received as a result of negligence on the part· of an
independent contractor or concessionaire when it is shown
that failure to exercise supervision proximately resulted in the
injuries sustained; and the fact that the proprietor did not
advertise the amusemen~ area is immaterial, it being sufficient
that he shared in the· proceeds of the amusement concessions.
ld.-Duties and Liabilities of Owner-Evidence-Sufficiency.In an action for injuries received by a carnival patron when
a strap on a concessionaire's amusement device broke, ~he e,:idence supported a finding that the owner of the premIses dId
not exercise a reasonably careful supervision of the concession
where he failed to inspect the device, to test its safety or to
question the concessionaire concerning its safety, the defect in
the strap being one which could have been revealed by a test
that the concessionl),ire made of other straps.
ld.-Duties and Liabilities of Owner-Pleading.-In an action
for injuries sustained by a carnival patron when a strap on a
concessionaire's amusement device broke, allegations of a complaint that defendant was the proprietor of the premises and
negligently equipped, constructed and maintained the device
thereon were sufficient to admit proof that he maintained the
premises, received a certain percentage of the gross proceeds
[5] Duty and liability of owner or keeper of place of amusement
respecting injuries to patrons, notes, 22 A.L.R. 610; 29. A.L.R. 29;
38 A.L.R. 357; 44 A.L.R. 203; 53 A.L.R. 855; 61 A.L.R. 1289; 98
A.L.R. 557. See, also, 24 Cal.Jur. 560; 26 R.C.L. 713, 717.
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of the concession in quel:itiun, and failed to inspect the device
.
to test its safety.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los .
Angeles County and from an order refusing judgment not~
withstanding the verdict. Ruben S. Schmidt, Judge. ·Af~
firmed.
Action for damages for personal injuries received, when S.
strap on an amusement device broke. judgment for plalntiff
affirmed.
.
i ,
Parker & Stanbury, Harry D.Parker. Raymo~d:,G. Stan."
bury and Vernon W. Hunt for Appeilant. " ' I
,'"
Borton, Petrini, Conron & Bortonand'Re~inaldi:!I3a~d~r',:
for Respondent.
.
,
TRAYNOR, J.-Venice Pier is le'ased'''frotnthe'~ityot
Venice by defendant Abbot-Kinney. Company and'ism8.iri~·
tainedand repaired by the latter. The carnival attractions
on the pIer are operated by concessionafres under contract'
with Abbot-Kinney Company. Defendant Samuel CraWford
was authorized to operate a "Loopa" on the pier, Under an
oral agreement that the company receiveM per' cent of the
gross receipts. The Loopa was somewhat like an old-fashioned
swing, with a board suspended by Rteel rods from an 'axle',
some fifteen or twenty feet above the ground. It was so'
constructed that riders standing on. the board could cause
the swing to make a complete circle around ,the axle. ' The
feet of the riders were strapped to the board andth'eir
shoulders to the steel rods. A sign by' the_ device stated : :
"They are safe. Riders are securely fastened in the Loopas/' .
There was evidence that an expert rider wOuldpiace no
strain on t~e straps, but that an inexperienced rider mi¥ht
place a stram of up to 360 11 0unds on ",ach strap. The straps
were made of leather folded over and stitched at various
places. Those in use when plaintiff' was irijured had been,
stitched shortly before that time by a shoe repairer. 'Craw.
ford had tested some of the straps by fastening them to a'
solid support and jumping on them, but he did 'not test tbQ
straps placed on the swing where the accident occurred.
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On August 10, 1940, the stitching in one of the ~ouldei'
straps came apart while plaintiff, Rober~ McCordl.c, was
riding the Loopa. He fell from the machme, an? ~lS head
struck violently against the ground. He washospltahzed for
more than three months. He commencE'd this action in May,
1941 against defendants Crawford, Abbot-Kinney Company,
Venice Mardi Gras Association, and Russell Lasher, who
was in charge of the Loopa when the accident occurred. During the trial the action was abandoned as. to the Mardi Gras
Association and a verdict was directed in favor of defendant
Lasher. A 'verdict was returned ir. favor of plaintiff against
the other defendants, and on January 14, 1942, judgment
was cntered for plaintiff. On January 16th, a written notice
of entry of judgment was served on iefendartts. It referred
accurately to the book and page wherl. the judgment was
entered but erroneously stated that the judgment had been
entered on January 13, 1942. In due time a motion for a
new trial was made, and on March 19, 1943, more than 60
days after the service of the notice i)f entry of judgment, a
new trial was granted. If the notice of entry of judgment
was valid, the motion for new trial was automatically denied
upon the expiration of the 60-day period. The court was
thereafter without jurisdiction to enter a contrary order,
and plaintiff had a right enforceable by mandamus to have
execution issued upon the judgment (Kahn v. Smith, post,
p. 12 [142 P.2d 13]; Payne v. Hunt, 214 Cal. 605
[7 P.2d 302]; Kraft v. Lampton, 13 Cal.App.2d 596 [57
P.2d 171]; Holq1dn v. Allison, 97 Cal.App. 126 [274 P.
1037] .) To protect itself against this possibility, defendant
Abbot-Kinney Company appeals from the judgment for
plaintiff and from the order denying its motion for judgment in its favor notwithstanding- the verdict. It is contended that the notice of entry of judgn:.ent was invalid and
did not start the 60-day period running because it contained
an inaccurate date of entry of the judgmcnt.
The necessity of setting limits to the time for granting a
new trial is recognized in section 660 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, which provides: "Except as otherwise provided
in section 12a of this code, the power of the court to pass on
motion for a new trial shall expire sixty (60) days from and
after service on the moving party of written notice of the
entry of the judgment, or if such notice has not theretofore
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been. served, then sixty (60) days after filing of the notice
of intention to move for a new trial. If such motion is. not'
determined within said period of sixty (60) days, or within
said period as thus extended, the effect shall be. a denial of
the motion without further order of the court."
[1] It is thus left to the prevailing party to take the initiative in .insuring the finality of the judgment by serving
upon the opposing party written notice of entry of the judg- ,
ment. When he does so, the time within which a motion for
new trial may be made (Labarthe v. McRae, 35. Cal.App.2d
734 [97 P.2d 251]) and granted (Gross v. Hazeltine, 206
Cal. 130 [273 P. 550]) begins to run. A notice of intention to move for new trial must be filed "within ten (10)
days after receiving written notice of the entry of judgment."
(Code Civ. Proc. section 659.) Until the date of service ihere
is no restriction on the right to move fora new tdal. ThUS
the date of service of notice of entry of the judgment marks
the starting point in this regard as well as for the sixty-day
period in which the court retains power to grant a motion
for new trial. [2] Since the date of entry of the judgment
itself is of no significance in either case, a notice of entry of
judgment in which it appears that the jll,dgment was entered
earlier than it actually was cannot serve to make the rights
of the prevailing party subject indefinitely to litigation. Section 660 does not require that the date of entry of the judgment be even mentioned j it does not in fact prescribe any
set form of notice. (See 20 Cal.Jur. 176; Waddingham v.
Tubbs, 95 Cal. 249 [30 P. 527] ; Santa Ana etc. Ca. v~ Ernest
Rurup Estate, 23 Cal.App.2d 445 [73 P;2d 908].) Th:us in
Waddi'ligham v. Tubbs, supra, a notice
of entry of judament
.
.
0
was held sufficient even though it referred merely to the
judgment heretofore entered. An error in the date is not
significant when the date itself is not. [3] An error in an
unessentialdetaiI cannot defeat the very purpose of the notice
authc)):izedby section 660. What is essential is that the notice
identify the judgment and advise the opposing party that
has been entered. The omission in the code itself of any
particularization of the form of notice .is in striking contradiction to the insistence upon a meticulous correctness of' the
unessential that would vitiate the provision for a sixty-day
period in which the court can pass on a motion for"new trhil:
[4] When the Legislature has fixed 'this period sixty day$

it
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..
6

MCCORDlC V. CRAWFORD

[23 C.2d

it is not for this court to fix it at sixty-on( or any other number of days or to override the limitation outright because an
otherwise correct notice fell' short of a perfection not prescribed by the section.. Lauritzen v. H. L. Judell &; Co., 109
Cal.App. 168 [292 P. 536], which assumed that the law was
otherwise, is disapproved. In Carpentier v. Thurston, 30 Cal.
123, relied on in the Lauritzen case, the court was concerned
with a statute requiring that notice of intention to move for
a new trial be filed within ten days after receipt of notice
that judgment had. been rendered. N'oticE> was given that the
judgment and findings had been signed. The court held that
these acts did not amount to the rendering of the judgment,
and that notice of other acts did not start the time running
in which to move fo'r new trial. There is nothing to indicate
that because the notice was h~ld defective on this ground it
would have been held defe(ltive had it merely contained an
inaccurate date of entry of judgment.
The unimportance of such an inaccuracy becomes apparent
in the light of the Legislature's concern to limit the time
within which the court has power to grant a new trial. Fol;'merly the requirement that. the motion for new triai be made
within 10 days after receipt of notice of entry of judgmellt
was not accompanied by any limitation on the time. in which
the court could dispose of the motion. (Code. Civ. Proc.
(1901) secs. 659, 660.) In 1915, however, lOection 659 was
amended to provide that tlie time for making the motion could
not be extended by order or stipulation. . Section' 660 was
Amended to limit the time in which the motion could be
granted to three months. (Stats. 1915, p. 201, 202.). in 1923
this period was reduced to two months (Stats. 1923, p. 234)
and in 1929 fixed at 60 days. (SUi.ts. 1929, p. 824.)
[5] Defendant contends that there is no evidence. of
negligence on its part and that if any negligence led to the
accident it is attributable to Crawford, the concessionaire.
'fhe law is well settled in, this state, however,"that a. proprietor, or one who operates a place of amusement, owes a
legal duty to exercise. due care to protect from injury individuals who come upon his premises by his express or
Implied invitation. He must see that such premises are in a
reasonably safe condition. It constitutes a breach of this
duty for him to fail to exercise reasonably careful supervision
of the appliances or methods of operating concessions under
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his manag:ement. The proprietor or operator. of such a place
of amusement is liable to an invited member of the public for
injuries received as the result of negligence on the part of an
independent contractor or concessionaire when it is shown
that the failure to exercise such supervision proximately re.
suIts in injuries to a patron. The duty of exercising care, and
the responsibility for the negligence of independent concessionaires, are extended by law to the owner, the occupier or
those in possession of the premises on which the amusement
is being operated." (Basye v. Craft's Golden State Shows,
43 Cal.App.2d 782, 788 [111 P.2d 746]; accord:Szasz v.
Joyland Co., 84 Cal.App. 259 [257 P. 871]; Johnstonev~
Panama Pac. I. E. Co., 187 Cal. 323 [202P.34];Harvey v.
Machtig, 73 Cal.App. 667 [239 P. 78];, Whyte v/-Idb"o/Park, .'
Co., 29 Cal.App. 342 [155 P. 1018]; Engstrom v. Huntley, 345.
Pa. 10 [26 A.2d 461] ; Hollis v. Kansas Oity etc:, Ass1i:'205
Mo. 508 [103 S.W. 32, 14 L.R.A;N.S. 284] ; StickeZv~ .RiVer-,
view Sharpshooters Park Co., 250
452'[95 N.:if i445, 34
L.R.A.N.S. 659] ; Wodnik v. Luna Park Amusement 00., 89
Wash. 638 [125 P. 941, 42 L.RA.N.S. 1070] ; Restatement,
Torts, sec. 344, p. 944; 22 A;L.R. 624; '29 A.L.R. 31, 736 ;44
A.L.R. 204; 53 A.L.R. 855; 61 A.L.R. 1289; 98 A.L.R.; 557.)
Defendant attempts to distinguish these cases' on' the
ground that it did not advertise the amusement area. It is
sufficient, however, that defendant, as the proprietor of Venice
Pier, sharing in the proceeds of the amusement concesSions
maintained the pier as a place of amusement open to th~
public. (Ibid.)
. /
[6] The evidence shows that defenda:nt did not exercise a
reasonably careful supervision of the concesSion iIi question:
It failed to make any inspection of the device'/to test its'safetY
or even to question Crawford concerning, its safety. Thecoii~.
tention cannot be sustained that an inspection of the defective:
strap would not have revealed the defect~ for the jury' eouId
reasonably conclude from the evidence that the defect would
have been revealed by the very test that Crawford made of
the other straps. The evidence shows that the defective strap
was not strong enough to withstand a load of 160 pounds, a
weakness that would have been revealed even 'by Crawford's
simple test, which subjected the other straps to a much greater
strain. The jury was clearly warranted in concluding that
the defendant would have discovered the defect in the strap
had it exercised reasonable care to inspect the Loopa and that

m.
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its failure to do so was the proxi~ate cause of plaintiff's injury.
.
[7] Defendant contends that the pleadmgs do not ch.8::ge
the defendant with failure to exercise rea.sonable supervISIOn
of the device in question. The allegatIOns of the second
amended complaint, however, that defendant was the proprietor of the pier and ne~ligently. equipped, con~tructed, an?
, . tained the device on ItS premIses were sufficIent to admIt
mam
'
. d . 25 per
proof that defendant maintained t h
e pI.er,
;ecelve
cent of the gross proceeds of the c?nCeSSIOn m questIon, an~
failed to inspect the device to test Its safety. More.over,. testImony as to all these facts was given during the trIal WIthout
objection.
The judgment and order appealed from are affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Schauer, J., concurred.
EDMONDS, J., Dissenting-By the decision of a majo~ity
of this court, the appellant is deprived of a remedy pec~lIa::
ly within the province of the trial judge to grant, W.hIch It
had sought with due diligence in proper form a~d. whIch t~e
trial judge had decided should be given .. In arrlvmg at thIS
conclusion, the majority opinion emphaSIzes bu.t ~ne. o~ the
two dates which start the running of the 60-day JUrlsdlCtIonal
period within which the trial court is empow~red to. gran~ a
motion for a new trial. The filing of the notIce of mtentlOn
to move therefor also starts the running of that period, and
in the present case, as in Kahn v. Smith, post, p'. 1~ [142
P.2d 13], the defendants filed such notice well wlthI~ ten
days from the service of the defective notice o~ entry of Judgment. (See Code Civ. Proc., sec. 659.) Certaml! ~here each
of the litigants serves and files a notice which lImIts the authority of the court to act, the court sh?ul.d hold .that, as between the two, one incorrect in form IS meffectlve and the
other authorizes judicial action which would be proper except
for the conflict between it and the defective notice. Furthermore, the decision of the majority fails to apply well-accepted
rules governing the scope of collateral attack upon app~al
able orders. (See discussion in my dissent in Kahn v. Sm~th,
post, p. 12 [142 P.2d 13].)
.
'l'he limitations upon the power of the trIal court to pass
upon a motion for a new trial must be considered in connection with the llurpose and policy of that procedure. Although
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it is primarily designed to secure are-examination of the
issues of fact, the motion also serves id bring to' thenoticedf
the court errors which mayhaye been committed'in thecolirse'
of the trial (see grounds fornew trial; Code eiv; Proc.;sec:
657) and provides an opportunity for the correction of such
errors without subjecting the parties, to the expense" an:d'iIil
convenience of an appeal (Spier v.Lan(j~ 4 CaL2d 711, 714
[53 P.2d138] ; and see cases cited in 39 Am.Jur.; New Triai,'
sec; 17, pp. 42, 43). In establishing thisprocedlire, the Legis~
lature has recognized that the interests of justice may require
an independent reweighing of the evidence by the trial 'judge
after rendition of the verdict by the jury, arid this court has,
upon occasions, criticized the reluctance of trial judges generally to exercise their power of granting a motion for a 'new
trial for insufficiency of the evidence and their'inclination to
acquiesce in a verdict which does not constitute the jv,st conclusion to be drawn from the evidence. (Greenv. Soule, 145
'Cal. 96,102 [78P. 337].) In case after case it has been emphasized that the trial judge, unlike an appellate court, has
had the same opportunity as the jury to observe the manner
of the witnesses and to pass upon their credibility; as a consequence he cannot rely upon a conflict in the evidence to
uphold the verdict but must exercise his' duty to see that it
is not clearly against the weight of the evidence. (Rosenberg
v. Geo. A. Moore &- 00., 194 Cal. 392,396'[229 P.34] ; Greene
v. Soule, supra, at pp. 102, 103; Bates v. Howard, 105 Cal. 173,
178 [38P. 715] ; D1:ckey v. Davis, 39 Cal. 565, 569; Gardner
v. Marshall, 56 Cal.App.2d 6'2, 66 [132P.2d 833] ; Lasch
Edgar, 46 Cal.App.2d 726, 730 [116 P.2d 949] ; Owings v.
Gatchell, 32 Cal.App.2d 482, 487, 488 [90 P.2d 268] ; and see
Tweedale v. Barnett, 172 Cal. 271, 274, 275 [156 P. 483] ;
Empire Investment 00. v. Mort, 169 Cal. 732, 736 [147 P.
960] ; Gordon v. Roberts, 162 Cal. 506, 508; 509 [123 P. 288];
Keogh v. Maulding, 52 Cal.App.2d 17,19 [125 P.2d 858];)
For he is ina position to determine between the apparent and
the real, and to detect the fallacy of specious testinlOily which
may have misled the jury, but which his wider experien:ceenabIes him to comprehend. (Bates v. Howard, supra, atp. 178.)
The parties are entitled to the verdict of the jury in the first
instance, but upon a motion for a new trial they are entitled,
to the independent determination of the judge as .to whether
Rlleh verdict is supported by the evidence. (Green v. SoUle,

v;

supr~>
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Undoubtedly these broad purposes have led the appellate
courts liberally to construe the limitations upon the exercise
of this power. Thus this court has held that so long as the
court "passes" upon the motion within the 60-day period, it
has lawfully exercised its jurisdiction to determine the motion, and the signing and filing of the formal order or findings subsequent to the last day of that period do not affect
the validity of its act. (Spier v. Lang, supra, at p. 715; Holland
v. Superior Court, 121 Cal.App. 523, 531 [9 P~2d 531).) And
although section 661 of the Code of Civil Procedure states
that the motion, if heard by a judge other than the one who
presided at the trial, "shall be argued orally or shall be submitted without oral argument ... not later than ten (10)
days before the expiration of the time within which the court
has power to pass on the same," the court has construed the
requirement as directory and not jurisdictional and upon
that theory 'affirmed an order granting a motion for a new
trial although the motion was submitted for decision but
three days before the expiration of the 60-day period. (Pappadatos v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. 334 [287 P. 342].)
Under section 660 of the Code of Civil Procedure either of
two dates ,may start the running of the 60-day jurisdictional
period within which the trial court has the power, to' pMS
upon amotion for a new trial. The party in whose favor the
judgment was rendered may fix the time by serving upon his
adversary written notice of the entry of judgment. On the
other hand, if such not.ice has not theretofore been served, the
jurisdictional period commences upon the filing of the notice
of intention to move for a 'new trial. The statute also , provides that if the motion is not determined within the specified
time, "the effect shall be a denial of the motion without further order of the court."
But in the present action, as in Kahn v, Smith, pos~,p.
12 [142 P.2d 13), and in Lituritzen v. H. L. JudeU &
Co., 109 CaLApp. 168 [292 P. 536), the court granted the motion for a, new trial within' sixty days from the filing of, the
notice of intention to move therefor, hence it was acting within
its jurisdiction if the notice of entry of judgment ,was ineffective. Three facts are particularly relevant in considering the
rights of the parties under these circumstances. In the first
place, the delay in passing upon the motion for a n,e", trial is
in no way attributable to the appellant, who acted promptly"
filing its notice of intention on the seventh day following the
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entry. of judgmen~. Secondly, the action of the trial judge in
grantmg. the motIOn shows that he intended to determine it
by ~ ruh~g and not to have it denied by the lapse of time
speCIfied m the s~atute. And, ftnally,the respondent did not
c~a~lenge the merIts of the ruling by an appeal from the order.
Glvmg eff:ct to the purpose of the motion and the desirability
?f pro~ot~ng the prompt .administra~ion of justice by allowmg trI.al Judges to ~et aSIde determInations not justi:ijed by,
the we~ght of the eVl~ence and to correct ~rrors w'hichwould'
otherWIse be the basIS of expensive and time-conSumm 'a peals, an~ departure from strict regularity in' the; rioti~e~f
entry of Jud~ent sho~ld render it hieffective aSia .li~it~tion
upon !he exerCIse ofthiS po~er, ContrarytQthe:respoi1dent's
assertion, the cases of Lau'Ntzen, v~H~ L~Judell&;Oo, au ra
and
Weeks v. Cae, 36 Ap, p.Div 339 [55 NY S 2' 6ft ]'"
p, t':
d .d d
"~
. , ' ' ' " were no
t~CI e, upon the groun~ that the error in the notice misled
. e opposmg party to hIS detriment,but upon the doctrine
Just stated,
'
"
Applying this. rule of construction, to the facts of the pres-:
ent case, the notice of entry of judgment set forth a.n erroneous date of entry. As a consequence the notice dId notliinit'
tb.e power of the court to pass upon the motiorl:for anew'}
trIal and, ~ the court granted the motion,' within sixty,d~ s
I'n't'n
, 't'"Ion, t:0' move"'
',' y
from
the filIng
f
" of the appellant's
. ' notice o"f', e
,or a ;new trIal, It was. actIng within the jurisd.i~ti()nai p~riod;
And. It may not b~ saId that Abbot~Kinney Co:mpany by" Ii :::
pealmg f;om the Judgment has waived its right to questi~Ii
t~~ s~ffiCIenCy ~f ~he n.otice, particularly since .it' has conSI~ en. y UJ;ged In Its brIefs that, the order granting, th~ new' ,
~nal. IS valId and that the appeal is taken onltO , ,'f ' "liT,
Its rIghts,
'
"y ,sa eguaru:"
N?r is the

appe~ant now precluded f~om~sserting that the'

~er:nc~ o,f theno~Ice of entry of judgment did notftx the ;
JurISd,I~tIOnal perIod for a ruling on a' m?tionfor,ne~,tr:ial

by, fallIng to .appeal from th~ order deriying its,moti~n to
strIke the 1l0tlC~ of entry of Judgment., For,aBsumiD.that ', '
such .an order I,S ,appealable, the denial; w~ not neoo!aril , '
a rulIng determmIng
the ' effect of 'the not!,ce.,
.'" ,Th'e cOl1rt may
,Yo 1
.h
h ave agree'd' WIt
the argument of counselthat th
:!l':Jt ", ,', '
vented the service of' the notice from limitI'ng" teh ' e ec pref~'
th
rt
','
epo:wer 0
e c?u t~ pas.supon the motion for neW' trial but in th '
.!., t hee
exercls, eh of Its dIscretion
. ' decided that
" the 'n:'oti'ce 'h
s owmg
~rror ~ ould remaIn a ~art of the record upon which it acted
III rulmg upon the motIOn for a new trial . Also , I'f th'e error
"

a

"h
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rendered the notice ineffective no real object would be served
by striking it from the files. Furthermore, the fact that the
notice might be ineffective for one purpose would not necessarily mean that it is ineffective for other purposes.
In relying upon the cases of Waddinghamv. Tubbs, 95 Cal.
249 [30 P. 527], and Santa Ana etc. Co. v. Ernest Rurup Estate, 23 Cal.App.2d 445 [73 P.2d 908], the majority opinion
fails to recognize the rule that a stronger showing is required
to justify interference with an order granting a new trial than
with one which has been denied. (See Abercrombie v. Thomsen, 59 Cal.App.2d 331, 337 [138 P.2d 701].) . Thus Wad~
dingham v. Tttbbs, supra, is clearly distinguishable from the.
present action, for there the court not only denied the motion
for a new trial but also held that there was no error in the
facts stated in the notice of entry of judgment. And in Santa
Ana etc. Co. v. E.rnest Rttrup Estate,supra, another case
where the motion for new trial was denied, the notice of entry
of judgment was in the customary form and correctly contained all of the necessary data.
For these reasons, I believe, as no appeal was taken from
the order granting a new trial, the judgment was· vacated
and the appeal should be dismissed.
Shenk, J., and Curtis, J., concurred.

'

if there is another adequate remedy, the writ is .~vailable a~

.
an alternative remedy where an appeal would be inadequate;. " .
in which case a failure to. appeal cannot render: the'trilif
court's determination res judicata.
. ,
. j ' :,.;,,:~(;.'?~ . '.
,

"

: ,...

'",~')'

.

,;<Htf.:~.':t){t

[3] Time-Fractions of a Day:-New" Trial-ProcedUr&-Statu:!

tory Period for Determination"""':'When Period ComnienceiC'
Fractions of a day are not consideredfD the compfttation
time if they do not affect the substantial rightso£<aparty~
They will be disregarded in ascertaining. whethe:r': notice ,of
entry of judgment was made within the,time prescribed.bi' '
Code Civ. Proc., § 660, as the time limit, for niaking:a motion
for new trial and the time limit for th~ court to pass on. such
motion starts from the day and not from thEiliour 'of service:
[4] Process-Notices and Papers-Giving Notic~By:M:ail..-Cod~
Civ. Proc., § 1013, allowing an additional day. after service by
mail if, within a given number of days after such service,. an
act is to be done by the adverse party, is not applicable in
mandamus proceeding to compel the county clerk to issue a.
writ of execution after the court erroneously granted a new
trial on the sixty-first day after notice of entry of judgment
was served, for the court is not an adverse party to such proceeding.
[5] Costs-Items Allowable-Attorney's Fees.-Attorney's fees are
not ordinarily awarded to the successful party without express
statutory authorization.

br

a

PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel County Clerk of
Orange County to issue a writ of execution. Writ of mandamus
granted.
[L. A. No. 18341. In Bank.

Oct. 6, 1943.J

FRED J. KAHN et al., Petitioners, v. B. J. SMITH, as
County Clerk, etc., Respondent.
[1] Mandamus-To Court Officers.-Mandamus is an appropriate

remedy to compel the county clerk to issue a writ of execution
where an order granting a new trial is invalid and execution
has been denied, despite the availability of an appeal from
that order.
[2] Id.-Conditions Affecting. Issuance-Existence of Other Remedy-Appeal as Inadequate.-While mandamus does not lie
[lJ See 16 Ca1.Jur. 837; 35 Am.Jur. 22.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Mandamus, § 66; [2J Mandamus,
§15(5)j [3J Time, §9; New Trial, §216(2); [4] Process, §86;
[5] Costs, § 32.

Laurence B. Martin for Petitioners.

J oelE. Ogle, County Counsel, and Forgy; Reinhaus & Forgy
for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-On August 25, 1939, Fred J. Kahn and
his wife, Alice J. Kahn, brought suit against the San Diego
Orange Growers and Mr. Glann Feldner. On August 22, 1940,
Mr. and Mrs. Kahn served notice on the defendants in that
action that the judgment in their favor had been entered on
the preceding day. They were in error, the judgment actually having been entered on the 22nd. Their error was the
result of misinformation ina letter to them from the county
[5] See 7 Cal.Jur. 286; 14 Am.Jur. 38.

